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Abstract: Discussions on personal bankruptcy regulations are usually focused on the controversial
effects of leniency on society, economy, financial markets, entrepreneurship, and labour supply.
However, the methodology of measuring leniency has been limited to one-time legislative changes
or some elements of the US personal bankruptcy system. In contrast, we create a composite index of
personal bankruptcy legislations. We calculate the composite index for 25 EU countries and the US as
a benchmark, validate the results, and rank the countries according to the leniency of their personal
bankruptcy systems. We analyse the index scores by region, law origin, and the age of the regime.
We conclude that the systems show high heterogeneity and cannot be clustered by region or legal
origin assumed based on former studies. However, there is a strong association between leniency
and the age of legislation. Results indicate that personal bankruptcy policies in the EU are usually
launched as creditor-friendly and are later shifted to a more lenient direction.
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JEL Classification: K35; G28; J18; O52
1. Introduction
Although personal bankruptcy (also named consumer bankruptcy) dates back to
ancient times, the US bankruptcy legislation is regarded as the first and benchmark regime
in modern societies. In modern terminology, personal bankruptcy law ‘is the legal process
for resolving the debts of insolvent individuals, married couples, / . . . / entrepreneurs,
and small business owners’ (White 2015, p. 3). After the acceptance of the US Bankruptcy
Code in 1979, personal bankruptcy regimes have expanded all over the world. Focusing
on Europe (Graziano et al. 2019), legislations were first passed in the Western European
countries (Great Britain 1986; France 1989; Germany 1994; Austria 1995; Belgium and the
Netherlands 1998–1999; Ireland 2012) and Scandinavian countries (Denmark 1984; Sweden,
Finland, and Norway 1994). From 2000, more countries introduced personal bankruptcy
legislations in Central and South-Eastern Europe: Slovakia (2006); Slovenia (2008); Czech
Republic (2008); Poland (2009); Hungary (2015); Croatia (2015); Romania (2018). Personal
bankruptcy regulation also exists in South-Europe: Spain (2013), Portugal (2004), Greece
(2010), and Italy (2012). Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have also implemented
the regulatory framework over the last 10–15 years.
The diverse approaches, structures, and legislative solutions lead to different focuses
in politics and scientific papers. Discussions about personal bankruptcy can be generally
categorised as (1) comparative analyses; (2) evaluation of the social insurance and the
relation of a fresh start, leniency to the incentives for entrepreneurship, the effect on labour
supply; and (3) moral hazard issues, the question of discharge, relief of debt, a fresh start,
and potential abuses; and (4) stigmatisation of the participants.
A key point in the comparative analyses of the systems is the attitude of legislators
towards leniency and its consequences on the economy and society. This complex question
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of leniency versus negative and positive social, economic, financial effects is always centred
in discussions among policymakers as well.
The terms describing leniency in the literature are related to the conditions of debt
relief, possible discharges, and the opportunity for a fresh start. Debt relief refers to general
measures taken to make it easier for a debtor to repay debts through deferral payments,
easing debt service payments, or discharge. The discharge could be partial or full, and
the borrower is relieved fully or partly from its obligations to a lender. The definition of a
fresh start is connected to both debt relief and discharge. According to the Supreme Court
Decision of 1934 by the US Courts, a fresh start
gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement
of preexisting debt. / . . . / This goal is accomplished through the bankruptcy
discharge, which releases debtors from personal liability from specific debts and
prohibits creditors from ever taking any action against the debtor to collect those
debts. (US Courts)
Bankruptcy procedures last until the borrowers receive a fresh start. In this complex
process, we can define three phases and three milestones. The first phase lasts until the
milestone of signing the first agreement/settlement between the creditors and borrower
(either based on an out-of-court or juridical decision). The second phase lasts until the
date when the specific agreement is fulfilled in either of the promoted regimes. Finally,
due to possible legislative steps, there could be further restrictions (called stigmas) for the
borrower even after being officially relieved from the obligations. These stigmas typically
start in the first and second phase and can continue after the official discharge in the third
phase to the third milestone. Based on the general definition, if the borrower passes the
second milestone, they receive a fresh start.
Leniency as a common term has a broader meaning than just discharge or a fresh start.
The level of leniency of a personal bankruptcy system shows how the system handles the
defaults of private individuals and entrepreneurs with unlimited liabilities, how easy or
difficult it is for borrowers to achieve a fresh start, and, additionally, how harsh or lenient
various possible stigmas are after receiving a fresh start. Although leniency is a key factor
for policymakers and researchers to compare systems and analyse the effects, the measure
of leniency was always limited to one-time events of legislative changes or some selective
elements (such as homestead exemptions, judicial customs) of the US federal system. With
this approach, the comparison and ranking of different legislations as well as cross-country
analysis of leniency as a factor affecting the economy and society were not possible.
Our aim of the research is to construct a composite index, which includes all the
characteristics and elements, in proportion to its importance, that the literature identified
with leniency. We aim to develop an index that enables researchers to measure the impact
of changes and the impact of cross-sectional differences in the leniency level of local
legislations on the economic sector (entrepreneurship, credit market, labour supply). It
develops a new option for researchers, where changes in leniency have been identified with
one-off major reforms or one leniency element (exemption differences) so far. Finally, with
the help of the leniency dimensions and index, we aim to compare and rank the personal
bankruptcy legislative systems of all EU countries from the leniency aspect, to analyse the
differences and similarities. We also aim to provide a tool for policymakers to understand
the leniency-nature and the status of the local legislations relative to other countries and
identify points where changes could make a significant shift if it is intended.
In the next sections, we first show how the literature identified and used leniency in
comparative analyses and other research fields so far. Then, we introduce a new complex
index for measuring leniency, which enables cross-country analyses and improves our
understanding of the changes in given bankruptcy regimes. Finally, we measure, rank and
analyse the leniency of the bankruptcy regimes of 25 EU countries, analysing the legislative
environment in force in the countries in the year of 2020.
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2. Literature Review
Personal bankruptcy regimes are of a great variety in the world, including the Eu-
ropean countries. One important group of personal bankruptcy literature includes com-
parative analyses. There is a grouping opportunity based on the general approach and
whose interests—the debtors or the creditors—are more represented in the process. It is
a widely accepted view that the debtors’ rights and interests are more preferred in the
US, where the legislations are more lenient than in continental European countries, where
creditor-friendly personal bankruptcy legislations are traditional. Efrat (2002, pp. 82–87)
grouped the countries in the world based on the availability, certainty, and promptness of
debt forgiveness as follows: conservatives have no discharge or fresh starts available; the
moderate group consists of a chance for discharge and a fresh start; and liberals are those
countries where a quick and automatic fresh start is available either via straight bankruptcy
or through repayment settlements. Ramsay (2007, 2012) discussed comparative consumer
bankruptcy and described the main features of regulation, such as the influence of the US
in introducing a fresh start in the legislations of European countries. He explained the
differences based on the path-dependence of legal institutions, cultural differences, law
origin or political interests, and the influence of different groups in society. Heuer (2014)
classified consumer bankruptcy regimes into 15 advanced economies of the world. He
identified a ‘common core’ of bankruptcies and defined four clusters of models (market,
restriction, liability, and mercy model) based on fresh-start opportunities and restrictions.
In an extensive study (Graziano et al. 2019), the legislations of 30 European countries
were presented and compared by country experts based on the same characteristics and
dimensions of the systems (access, discharge, processes, competent courts, debtors’ and
creditor’s position, costs, etc.). Kilborn (2020)presented a comparativeexploration of the
personal bankruptcy systems of Russia and some countries in Europe and North America.
He focused on the eligibility and cost dimensions of the systems and revealed parallels
with the structure of Russia and the benchmark countries. Ramsay (2020)discussed the
implementation of the English Debt Relief Order of 2009 as a procedure for low-income
debtors. He did comparative research of NINA (No-Income-No Asset) procedures in
several countries such as Ireland, New Zealand, SouthAfrica but also referred to European
jurisdictions (e.g., in Germany) where this solution was not allowed.
If consumer protection is reduced, there are three effects on consumers and debtors.
Firstly, debtors lose some of their existing protections (influencing entrepreneurship devel-
opment). Secondly, there is an indirect effect of consumers receiving lower prices, which
is debtors’ lower interest rates, and thirdly, there is a demand-expansion effect leading
a new debtor to enter the market. These effects on the credit market are called “credit
rationale” (Alexandrov and Jimenez 2017). Therefore, besides comparative analysis, the
second relevant big group of literature we discuss here relates to this relationship among
leniency, fresh start, the intensity of the insurance effect (the appearance of labour incen-
tives, the entrepreneurial incentives), the existence of credit rationale, and their net effect
on society. We can categorise these studies based on their main focuses—effect of leniency
on entrepreneurship, credit rational, labour supply—in three subgroups.
The first subgroup focused on the effect of fresh start and leniency on entrepreneurial
activity, whether more lenient personal bankruptcy systems made a positive effect on
entrepreneurial activity. Fan and White (2003) concluded that greater state-level exemptions
were associated with an increase in overall entrepreneurship. They exploited variation
in the homestead exemption across US states, and one of the main findings was that
the probability of owning a business was significantly higher in states with unlimited
rather than low exemptions. Agarwal et al. (2005) analysed the impact of bankruptcy
homestead and personal property exemption levels in different states on the likelihood of
small business owners filing. Based on the files in the years 2000–2002, they found that the
likelihood increased with gradually higher exemption levels. Lee et al. (2008) presented
a real options perspective to present how entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy encouraged
entrepreneurship developments. Armour and Cumming (2008) used aggregated data
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from 15 countries in North America and Europe in 1990–2005 to analyse the conditions of
discharge on entrepreneurship. They created and scored bankruptcy indices to evaluate
the effect. They found that the lenient bankruptcy laws measured by the conditions of
discharge significantly increased self-employment rates. Some papers conflicted with the
results of the positive entrepreneurial effect of lenient systems. Cumming and Li (2013)
examined the business starts and deaths on data over 1995–2010 concerning several aspects
of public policy in the US. It showed a positive impact from the homestead exemption on
entrepreneurship development only among the states in the bottom quartile and otherwise
highlighted a negative impact. Patel and Devaraj (2021) examined the state-level exemption
changes in the US and their effect on entrepreneurial activity. However, their results did
not support the view that asset protection in personal bankruptcy systems improved
entrepreneurial activity.
The second subgroup focused on the appearance of credit rationale due to a fresh start
and leniency, whether more lenient personal bankruptcy systems created credit rational.
Berkowitz and White (2004) examined homestead exemptions across US states, they found
that small firms with more lenient exemptions faced higher interest rates and face credit
rational. White (2007) argued that the change to a less lenient system resulted from the
BAPCPA led to a significant increase in the volume of revolving household debts. Some
papers did not support the appearance of credit rationing. Pavan (2008) analysed the
exemption level, the accumulation of wealth, and the tighter credit constraints. The study
found that the net effects of changes in exemption on insurance and credit constraints were
very small, and a more lenient policy reduced the net durable wealth in the first half of the
life cycle. Simkovic (2009) examined the credit card industry and found little evidence that
credit conditions for consumers improved due to the introduction of BAPCPA. Hintermaier
and Koeniger (2011) also analysed homestead exemptions in the states of the US and
found that bankruptcy regulation had only a small effect on the quantity and price of
unsecured debt.
Although a relatively large number of studies examined the relationship between
leniency systems, fresh start, credit rational, and entrepreneurship, only a few papers—in
the third subgroup—have analysed the relationship between fresh start and credit rationale
to labour supply or labour incentives (e.g., Li et al. 2017; Han and Li 2007, 2011). A recent
study by Chen et al. (2020) examined the effect of changes in personal bankruptcy systems
on labour supply from the employer’s sides. They analysed whether and how changes in
personal bankruptcy laws and the access of individuals to bankruptcy protection affected
labour costs and corporate policies. They concluded that after a negative change in leniency,
firms followed more conservative policies to mitigate employees’ expected welfare losses.
The literature dominantly focused on the US market and federal legislation, while
fewer papers dealt with European countries. Davydenko and Franks (2008) examined the
bankruptcy law and its effect on the credit market in some European countries (France,
Germany, and the UK) based on firm data. Fossen and König (2015) and Fossen (2014)
focused on the effect of the reform of the Insolvency Code of Germany in 1999; the change
led to a more lenient direction. Jia (2015) analysed the diverse welfare impact on workers
and entrepreneurs in Europe.
Summarising the role and appearance of leniency in the literature presented above,
these studies typically explored the overall effect of introducing the institution of fresh start
under different legal circumstances or analysed a one-time change of new lenient or strict
measures. They focused on the possible effects of a single event-though unable to measure
the magnitude of the reform—on employment and entrepreneurship along with the results
on the financial market (access to loans, prices, etc.). A typical field for such research is
the introduction of stricter measures of BAPCPA in 2005 in the US (such as Alexandrov
and Jimenez 2017; Simkovic 2009; White 2007) or a major reform in a country (e.g., the
reform in Germany, see Fossen and König 2015; Fossen 2014). By characterising leniency
for similar purposes, other papers highlighted some specific elements of the legislative
systems, either by carrying on an empirical analysis or developing theoretical models.
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These papers typically characterised leniency with the homestead exemption levels of
the different federal state-level legislations (e.g., Cumming and Li 2013; Hintermaier and
Koeniger 2011; Pavan 2008; Agarwal et al. 2005; Berkowitz and White 2004; Berkowitz and
White 2004; Fan and White 2003).
Based on the literature reviewed, we identified a research gap from two aspects. First,
besides one-time events as a trigger and the differences in exemptions regulation that
the literature regularly applied, there were no complex indicators constructed to describe
and measure leniency level and the changes in leniency. To fill this gap and construct a
composite measure, former comparative and descriptive analyses help us to identify the
important indicators and dimensions of bankruptcy legislations, to compare and group
regulations in the end. These papers described the main elements of the systems, in
addition to the factors of leniency, and made some comparisons and analyses based on
selected characteristics but not based on a composite index including all relevant aspects.
We found one research that built and scored indicators to describe the fresh start and
bankruptcy characteristics of personal bankruptcy systems. Armour and Cumming (2008)
created and scored six bankruptcy indicators (called ‘indices’: availability of discharge,
years to discharge, minimum debt, exemptions, disabilities, the possibility of agreeing
on a composition) to evaluate the effect on self-employment. We incorporate most of
these indicators into our model, together with the elements of leniency used by other
comparative studies in one composite index that creates the possibility for comparison and
ranking. This index substantially broadens the number of indicators to characterise the
seven main dimensions relative to any other comparative or policy-effect studies.
Secondly, most of the comparative papers focused on a group of selected developed
countries of Europe, North America, or Asia, but typically not explicitly on Europe or not
on the whole EU. We found one extensive study about the EU and other European countries
(the book of Graziano et al. 2019). They thoroughly described the legislation in a structured
way and made some comparative analyses (see the chapter of Sajadova in Graziano et al.
2019) but did not select, identify, measure, compare in full, or rank the leniency elements of
the countries and evaluate the leniency level that we do in our research presented in the
next section.
3. Construction of a Composite Index of Leniency
Composite indicators gained great popularity in research during the last decades,
resulting in a large amount of literature describing the methodology and ways of building
composite indicators and indices. Greco et al. (2019) gave a complex review of the
literature describing the methodological framework of constructing composite indices.
For the development of composite indices, OECD (2008) described the methodology as a
10-step process that serves as a checklist. In comparing the legislation of different countries,
we also considered the methodology used by La Porta et al. (1998) for similar purposes.
The level of leniency of a personal bankruptcy system describes how the system
handles the defaults of private persons and entrepreneurs with unlimited liabilities, how
easy or difficult it is for borrowers to achieve a fresh start, and how stigmatic the life of the
borrower is after receiving the fresh start. More lenient systems enable a fresh start more
easily, and the stigmas afterwards are less severe; in a less lenient system, a fresh start is
either not offered at all or only after a restrictive, long, stigmatic, uncomfortable, expensive,
and complex process with additional stigmas.
Leniency is, thus, an aggregative term that we characterise by seven main dimensions of
personal bankruptcy legislations: (1) accessibility, the existence of straight bankruptcy1;
(2) eligibility; (3) costs; (4) complexity; (5) process; (6) conditions for discharge at debt
restructuring; (7) stigmas of filing. These dimensions partly correspond to the categories
defined by White (2007), who analysed the systems of some selected countries (US, France,
Germany, England, Canada). She compared the bankruptcy policies based on the trade-off
between providing insurance to debtors versus punishing default. She also used seven
categories for the selection: the amount of debt discharged, asset exemptions, income
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exemptions, fraction of income above the exemption that debtors must use to repay, length
of the repayment obligations, bankruptcy costs, and bankruptcy punishments. These
categories correspond to our dimensions of ‘process’, ‘conditions of discharge’, ‘costs’, and
‘stigmas’, but we completed them with several other dimensions and indicators.
We break down the seven main dimensions into 35 specific indicators. The seven groups
of indicators altogether describe the dimensions and phenomena. Our dimensions and
categories also follow the structure of the comparative analysis and country report of
30 European consumer bankruptcy legislations of Graziano et al. (2019), who described
regimes based on the possible processes, costs, discharge conditions, status of debtors, and
creditors, supervision, and officeholders’ roles.
By data selection, we examined and analysed the regime of 25 EU countries and
the US as a benchmark. Two countries (Bulgaria and Malta) currently have no personal
bankruptcy regulations. We created indicators based on questions that are formulated for
each subdimension. We obtained the data from complex legislations, which sometimes
include different laws and judicial customs. By setting the indicators, we examined each
country’s regime in parallel with the comparative research in this field (Armour and
Cumming 2008; Graziano et al. 2019). Legislative solutions in Europe are highly diverse.
We searched for data that, first, unequivocally characterise the selected phenomenon
and, secondly, could be detected in all the legislations. Data and indicators must also be
comparable in different countries, and potential answers must be separative, covering all
or most of the possible alternatives included in the legislation. Answers based on metric
indicators (such as the cost of filing, volume of deposit, length of repayments, number of
regimes, or number of years for restrictions, etc.) are typically unambiguous. However,
non-metric indicators reflect various potential activities (events, constraints, income types,
credit types, benchmarks, types of punishment, etc.), which are listed in different ways for
each regime, and where legal concepts are fragmented in their definition or scope across
EU jurisdictions. The formulation of these indicators must cover all the main possibilities
in different local legislations. In some cases, indicators refer to a phenomenon that can
be answered unambiguously (such as who drafts the repayment plan first, who bears
the cost, whether the pre-action stage exists or not). In a few cases, however, subjective
expert opinions need to be obtained regarding the complexity. Missing or doubtful data
are completed based on consultations with the country’s legal experts.
We improved the data collection, indicator definitions, and data quality parallel to
the analysis of laws and by discussing preliminary results with experts from 19 countries.
These experts, specialised in their local regime, validated the indicator scores of their
countries. The created dimensions and indicators are detailed in Table 1. Based on the
comparative studies mentioned in the literature review section, we believe that these
indicators are equally important to describe a dimension, and these dimensions altogether
characterise the phenomena of leniency properly.
Similar to former studies (La Porta et al. 1998; Armour and Cumming 2008), we chose
a categorical scale assigning a score to each indicator. Categories are numerical: zero, one,
or two. The higher the score, the more lenient the given phenomenon to the borrower. In
the case of metric indicators, we determined thresholds based on the frequency and ranking
of the data collected from the legislations to obtain the final scores. These thresholds appear
based on the length of payment period, benchmark of necessary repayment, length of
stigma for a new discharge, court fee, and deposit level.
As there are different numbers of indicators in each dimension, we aggregated the
indicators at two levels. On both levels, we applied the linear aggregation as all individual
indicators have the same measurement unit, and scores are all expressed on the same
interval scale. In this case, compensability is admitted.
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Table 1. Dimensions and indicators.
Dimensions Indicators
1. Straight bankruptcy (accessibility,
existence)
• Straight bankruptcy, as a separate regime, is part of the legislation
• Walk-away opportunity
2. Eligibility:
• Entitled persons to participate, to file for in the process (natural person, private
entrepreneurs, special conditions, limitation due to former procedures)
• Preconditions, constraints in wealth, income, collaterals, status to start
• Exclusion criteria of criminal record
• Preconditions in debt (minimum, maximum volume)
• Stigmas that impede filing
3. Cost, expensiveness (transaction
costs):
• The magnitude of starting administrative costs
• Distribution of costs among stakeholders
• Deposit requirements
4. Complexity
• Variety of types of creditors
• Variety of officers who conduct, and variety of regimes
• Complexity to start a procedure
• Complexity to overview the process for professionals
• Availability of a debt counselling service and its conditions
5. Process
• Any pre-action stage, amicable settlement incorporated in the process flow
• Entitled persons to initiate a procedure (creditor, debtor, or legislation)
• The initiator of the first draft of the repayment plan
• Creditors included in the process
• The degree of disability of the debtor during the process
• Decision mechanism during the process (the majority of creditors, court, etc.)
• Asset sale—who is entitled to sell the assets, properties
• Possible consequences of commencement of the procedure
• Exemptions (based on threshold, property and income types, future
incomes/properties)
• Possible easing measures, decision during the repayment, debt settlement processes
• Possible penalties, consequences due to violation of the duties (the debtor)
6. Conditions for discharge at debt
restructuring:
• Existence of a full discharge
• Length of maximum necessary repayment obligation, the settlement period
• Level of necessary repayment benchmark for closing (as a percentage of debt)
• Conditions of discharge or automatic discharge
• The validity of discharge is for all credits, claims depending on whether lodged in
the process
7. Stigmas of during and after
filing
• Existence of other provisions against the debtor (ban to take up loans, controlling
incomes and expenses, investments)
• Publicity stigmas (appearance in public registries, announcements, etc.)
• Restriction on further access to similar discharge later on
• Stigmatic name in legislation (bankruptcy, debt settlement)
As most composite indices (OECD 2008, p. 31), we used equal weights (EW) with
linear aggregation for different numbers of indicators within one dimension; we considered
all the selected indicators of a dimension equally important to characterise each specific
dimension. This is consistent with the quantitative research of La Porta et al. (1998),
who also used linear weighted average in creating indicators to compare legal systems of
countries.
However, it is disputable as to which dimension is more important to characterise the
overall leniency. Therefore, we applied a budget allocation process (BAP) with experts and
used linear aggregation to calculate the composite index from seven main dimensions. The
advantage of BAP is that it is transparent, straightforward, and “proper weights are based
here by expert opinion that could better reflect policy priorities” (OECD 2008, p. 31). The
prerequisites of applying the method referred to in the literature—less than 10 dimensions
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and a diversified expert panel of more than 10 members—are met (Greco et al. 2019; Zhou
et al. 2012; OECD 2008). We selected a panel of 16 experts to estimate weights with different
professional backgrounds (academics, practitioners, lawyers, economists) from 15 different
EU countries.
We asked about their judgments of the relative importance of the respective indicator
groups (dimensions). Finally, we calculated the average of the weights given by the experts.
These average weights of the main dimensions were used for the calculation of the final
composite indices for all the countries. The weights (and how they differ from a potential
EW aggregation) and the main descriptive statistics of the BAP are given in Table 2 and
Figure 1.
Table 2. BAP Weights vs. EW weights and their statistics.
Equal Weights BAP Weights
Dim1: Straight bankruptcy 14.3% 11.7%
Dim2: Eligibility criteria 14.3% 16.6%
Dim3: Cost 14.3% 15.8%
Dim4: Complexity 14.3% 11.9%
Dim5: Process 14.3% 13.9%
Dim6: Conditions for discharge 14.3% 18.8%
Dim7: Stigmas 14.3% 11.4%
Note to Table 1. Three dimensions—condition of discharge, eligibility, and costs—were found to be dominant in
the evaluation of the expert panel. These dimension scores become dominant in the final composite index scores.
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Figure 1. BAP Weights and EW weights statistics. Note to Figure 1. Opinions on whether straight
bankruptcy is an important element of leniency were very heterogenous (Dim1), resulting in an
average weight of 12%. The least important dimension is stigma (Dim7) with less volatility.
Based on the expert opinions, three dimensions were found to be dominant in the
evaluation: eligibility, costs, and the condition of discharge. It is worth mentioning that the
opinions on whether straight bankruptcy is an important element of leniency were very
heterogenous, while eligibility to straight bankruptcy was the focus of the well-known
conservative BAPCPA reform.
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4. Results and Discussion
We performed a cross-sectional analysis focusing on the year of 2020, when the
database is fully available for each country. We analysed the actual legislative environment
in force in the countries in the year 2020, although we also considered a longer period from
the first legislation considered (1979 (US)–2020) to better understand the structure of the
system due to the occasional main reforms.
We scored the 35 indicators for the 25 countries, which were validated by 19 experts.2
After aggregating the scores, we calculated country indices, which can theoretically range
from 0 to 2, and ranked the countries (Table 3), creating a leniency map of Europe (Figure 2).
We also compared the BAP aggregation results with an EW aggregation of the dimensions.
As a result, country indices range from 0.8 to 1.6. The benchmark index of the US legislation
is 1.37, placing the US among the top five countries in the ranking. There are no significant
changes in the ranking if we use EW instead of BAP.
Table 3. Leniency ranking of countries based on BAP and EW aggregation.
Ranking Country Index (BAP) Country2 Index (EW)
1 Denmark 1.58 Denmark 1.56
2 Sweden 1.47 Sweden 1.42
3 Poland 1.41 France 1.35
4 France 1.38 Luxembourg 1.34
5 Luxembourg 1.37 Poland 1.32
6 Greece 1.29 Greece 1.29
7 Slovakia 1.27 Slovakia 1.25
8 Austria 1.25 Czech R. 1.23
9 Czech 1.24 Estonia 1.22
10 Estonia 1.22 Austria 1.21
11 Finland 1.19 Finland 1.16
12 Spain 1.16 Spain 1.13
13 Ireland 1.14 Ireland 1.09
14 Portugal 1.12 Slovenia 1.08
15 Netherlands 1.11 Portugal 1.06
16 Slovenia 1.11 Netherlands 1.05
17 Croatia 1.08 Belgium 1.03
18 Italy 1.05 Croatia 1.03
19 Belgium 1.04 Italy 1.00
20 Cyprus 0.98 Romania 0.96
21 Germany 0.97 Cyprus 0.94
22 Romania 0.97 Germany 0.90
23 Latvia 0.87 Latvia 0.88
24 Hungary 0.87 Hungary 0.85
25 Lithuania 0.85 Lithuania 0.82
Note to Table 3. Scores range theoretically from 0 to 2, from less to more lenient. The benchmark index of the
United States is 1.37. No significant changes can be detected in the ranking if we use EW instead of BAP.
Table 4 presents the dimension scores of the countries that signed their relative devi-
ation to the mean with colour. It shows that countries ranked as least lenient reach high
scores in some dimensions. We expected the US Bankruptcy Code to be at the top; however,
as can be seen, in some aspects (‘cost’ and ‘stigma’), it is less lenient than the average of
the EU, although it offers the institution of the straight bankruptcy. The correlation matrix
of the dimensions shows no strong correlations among the dimensions; the correlation
coefficients range from −0.1 to 0.4, and except for one, the correlations are not significant.3
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Table 4. The dimension scores and final leniency index with BAP aggregation.
SB_DIM EL_DIM CO_DIM CX_DIM PR_DIM DC_DIM ST_DIM Leniency Index
Denmark 1 1.40 2.00 1.60 1.82 1.60 1.50 1.58
Sweden 0 1.80 2.00 1.40 1.36 1.60 1.75 1.47
Poland 1 1.40 2.00 0.80 1.55 2.00 0.50 1.41
France 0.5 1.60 2.00 1.40 1.73 1.00 1.25 1.38
Luxembourg 0 1.60 2.00 1.40 1.45 1.20 1.75 1.37
Greece 2 1.80 0.33 1.00 1.27 1.60 1.00 1.29
Slovakia 1 1.60 1.67 1.00 1.45 1.00 1.25 1.27
Austria 1 1.20 1.33 1.00 1.36 1.60 1.00 1.25
Czech R. 1 1.20 1.00 2.00 1.27 1.40 0.75 1.24
Estonia 1 1.40 0.33 1.80 1.64 1.40 1.00 1.22
Finland 0 0.40 1.67 1.80 1.18 1.80 1.25 1.19
Spain 1 1.40 1.67 1.00 1.36 1.00 0.50 1.16
Ireland 1 1.60 0.67 0.60 1.18 1.60 1.00 1.14
Portugal 0 1.20 1.67 1.00 1.18 1.40 1.00 1.12
Netherlands 0 0.80 1.33 1.60 1.09 1.80 0.75 1.11
Slovenia 0.5 1.40 0.33 1.80 1.18 1.60 0.75 1.11
Croatia 0.5 1.20 1.33 1.00 1.45 1.25 0.50 1.08
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Table 4. Cont.
SB_DIM EL_DIM CO_DIM CX_DIM PR_DIM DC_DIM ST_DIM Leniency Index
Italy 0 1.80 0.67 0.80 1.45 1.25 1.00 1.05
Belgium 1 0.20 1.67 0.67 1.09 1.40 1.25 1.04
Cyprus 0.5 1.25 0.67 1.00 0.91 1.50 0.75 0.98
Germany 0 1.80 0.67 0.60 1.09 1.40 0.75 0.97
Romania 0.5 0.60 1.67 0.67 1.45 0.80 1.00 0.97
Latvia 0 0.40 0.33 2.00 1.45 1.20 0.75 0.87
Hungary 0 0.40 1.67 1.00 1.32 0.80 0.75 0.87
Lithuania 0 0.60 0.67 0.80 1.27 1.40 1.00 0.85
US 2.00 1.60 0.67 1.40 1.82 1.40 0.75 1.37
Note to Table 4. Green scores represent leniency-dimension-score above, red scores represent below-the-mean of the given dimension.
Codes: SB = straight bankruptcy; EL = eligibility; CO = cost; CX = complexity; PR = process; DC = discharge; ST = stigma.
Grouping the index scores based on the regional position of the country (Figure 3),
we see that no homogeneity is visible due to the extreme scores of some countries. In the
‘younger’ region of CEE, some are positioned out of the main group. This means that
countries that typically launched their systems earlier and made reforms in a more lenient
direction ever since (such as Poland in 2009 and Slovakia in 2017) have higher scores, and
the recently launched systems in Hungary and Romania are less lenient. In South-Eastern
Europe, Greece stands far apart from the core group with its more lenient system. In
the northern part of Europe, Scandinavia seems to form a different group from the Baltic
countries, running a generally more lenient system. Estonia is visibly more lenient than the
other Baltic countries. In Western Europe, leniency seems to be very heterogeneous, with
index scores ranging from 0.97 to 1.37. On the other hand, the leniency levels in the group
of countries of South Europe are closer.
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Figure 3. Index scores grouped by region and by law origin. Note to Figure 3. No homogeneity is
visible based on the regional position or law origin.
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We also grouped the index scores based on law origin as a possible explanation
for similarities. Figure 3 shows that French law origin countries tend to have closer
leniency levels. However, other counties with similar law origin backgrounds do not form
homogenous groups.
We ran a cluster analysis based on the dimension scores. The hierarchical cluster
analysis shows no reasonable clusters with different distance measures. The elbow method
confirms that no informative clusters can be determined. Cluster analysis based on three
main dimensions (eligibility, expensiveness, discharge) results in more separable clusters.
In this case, the elbow analysis suggests three to four, with a maximum of five clusters
(Appendix A.3). After calculating the K-Mean clusters for three, four, and five clusters
based on the three dimensions (Appendix A.4), it seems that the K-Mean cluster analysis
of five clusters is the only one that induces some intuitive explanations (Figure 4).
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eligibility, cost, and condition of discharge.
Despite some possible intuitive grouping explanations (such as regional similarities
in the clusters of Lithuania and Latvia as red plots; Romania and Hungary as green
plots, or Austria-Czech R.-Croatia as blue plots), no overall explanation can be made.
Generally, these analyses confirm our view that the legislations are very heterogenous
from the leniency structure point of view, and clear and informative clusters based on the
dimensions or fi al scores cannot be formed.
ls l s t ss i ti t t f t l isl ti ( i i t s t
iff t een 2020 and the year of launching the first personal bankruptcy legislation
in the country) and the leni ncy l vel. A visible a sociation c n be detecte in the scat er-
plot (Figure 5), which is confirmed by a correlation calcul tion with a coeffici nt of 0.67
and high si nificance. The older th legis ation, the more time has passed since ts first
imple entation, the more lenient it is.
introduced reforms in the past. Basically, most of them shifted their respective regime to a
more lenient system. The exceptions are the US BAPCPA reform of 2005 in the United States,
the correction in Greece in 2013, and the changes in the Netherlands in 2008. We marked
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countries based on if any ‘leniency reform’ was made after launching or no considerable
change in the regulation was introduced. In the scatterplot (Figure 5), the countries with
no significant reform yet (marked with red) are typically in the less lenient region, relative
to countries that have already undergone a considerable reform (marked with blue).
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We divide the countries (and, thus, also the timeline) into two parts. The first group
includes the more developed Western European (WE) and North European (NE) countries,
which typically launched their systems earlier. The second group consists of the latecomers
in the CEE, SE, and SEE. We create two scatterplots (Figure 6) for the two groups.
Figure 6 also visibly supports the association between leniency and the age of regime
in the two separate groups, especially among the CEE-SE-SEE countries.
Our results are consistent with the comparative literature in several aspects. As
expected, the leniency level of the US is high relative to the average of EU countries. The
US system was the first personal bankruptcy legislation to introduce discharge, belong to
the “liberal camp” of Efrat (2002) and the “market model” cluster of Heuer (2014), and give
the most insurance value to individuals (Jia 2015). The EU countries’ systems, in general,
reflect the interest of the policymaking of the financial market and banking sector more
(Ramsay 2012). On the other hand, despite our expectations, some European countries
have already reached the leniency level of the US due to the major reforms, which shifted
the leniency up (see Sweden, Denmark, Poland, France). We must also consider that the
BAPCPA reform of 2005 decreased the leniency of the US system, and its leniency level
must have been higher at that time. It was likely to be above the current level of the most
lenient European regulations and likely to be far above the leniency level of European
countries in 2005. This result can also explain why the US reforms were urged before 2005.
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Note to Figure 6. Association between leniency and the age of regime is especially visible among the
CEE-SEE countries that launched their systems later.
Our results are also consistent with the view that the personal bankruptcy legislation of
the EU is very heterogenous among the countries based on the institutional path, ideology,
or the interest groups in the economy and society (Ramsay 2012). The lack of heterogeneity
can also be seen in papers urging for harmonisation (e.g., Niemi 2012). The differences
in leniency explain why an EU regulation was also implemented (EU n.d.) on insolvency
procedures to avoid the so-called ‘forum shopping’, the arbitraging opportunities among
different county regulations. However, our calculation contradicts the clustering results of
the previous study of Heuer (2014) as our cl sters only partly correspond to the ‘mercy
model’ of Scandinavian cou tries or the ‘liability model’ of Germany and Austria. Denmark
and Sweden are ranked on the top and in the same cluster; however, Finla d is in a different
group, and Austria and G rm ny do not belong to the same groups either. However, we
must also mention that there was a major reform in Austria since that study that modified
its leniency. As in other comparative legislation research (La Porta et al. 1998), we can
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assume that the law origin is associated with the leniency level. Our results show that
French law origin countries tend to have closer leniency levels. However, other counties
with similar law-origin backgrounds do not form homogenous groups.
In addition to presenting rankings, comparative description, and showing the hetero-
geneity of the systems, one of the most important results is the association between age and
leniency. It seems that the older the legislation, the more lenient it becomes. This supports
the hypothesis that countries’ personal bankruptcy regulations are usually launched as
more creditor-friendly and are later shifted to a more lenient direction. We do not find an
explanation or similar conclusions in the literature. We assume that countries’ bankruptcy
regulations are usually rather strict at launch, due to fear of potential abuse.
5. Conclusions
A large part of the literature on personal bankruptcy focused on the effects of fresh
start and the level of leniency on society, financial markets, entrepreneurship, and labour
supply. However, measuring leniency in these papers was limited to one-time legislative
changes or a few characteristics such as homestead exemptions. To fill this research gap, we
create a compact measure of the leniency, collecting the relevant categories and developing
the main dimensions based on former studies of the comparative literature in this field.
These dimensions prove to be independent and, after aggregation, could be used to rank
countries, identify differences, set a basis for analysing the differences across countries,
and measure changes in the legislation. The composite index enables researchers and
policymakers to accomplish comparative analyses and to identify the effect of differences
and changes in the legislation on the economic factors in a more complex way than formerly
discussed in the literature.
In the second part of the research, we use this composite index framework to measure,
rank, and compare the leniency of the EU countries’ legislations and the US regime as a
benchmark. Fulfilling this additional research gap and focusing only on all countries in
the EU, we systematically assess all the countries by scoring the categories, and we finally
aggregate the scores applying the elaborated methodology. Based on the index scores, we
rank the countries and identify the more and less lenient regimes. By analysing scores
based on region, law origin, and cluster analysis, we conclude that systems inside the
EU are very heterogenous and no real clusters with intuitive explanation can be detected.
Though heterogeneity was expected to some extent based on the literature, we note that
neither the law origin nor regionality supports any strong association with leniency, which
contradicts former studies and assumptions, and it shows higher diversity than expected.
Our scores and ranking correspond to the literature concerning that the US system is
regarded as traditionally very lenient; however, it contradicts our expectation in the sense
that some of the European countries seem to reach or even exceed this level due to the
major reforms (debtor-friendly in the EU, restrictive in the US) implemented in the last
10–20 years.
On the other hand, it is an important novelty of our research that there is a strong
association between leniency level and the legislation age. Charts and correlations support
the hypothesis that the older a legislation, the more lenient it is. We assume that countries’
bankruptcy regulations are usually rather strict at launch and are later shifted to a more
lenient direction. This result raises the need for further research to understand the political,
economic background or possible causality.
As regards the limitation of our research, it is a cross-sectional analysis and shows
the leniency level of the countries based on the regulation valid in these countries in 2020.
When new major reforms are implemented, our results and conclusions could change;
therefore, continuous monitoring and updates in the scoring and calculations are necessary.
Furthermore, our study focuses only on the EU. Some European countries that virtually
play an important role in Europe (e.g., Great Britain, Switzerland, Norway, or Russia) are
not in the scope. Finally, the scoring is sensitive to the interpretation of the wide variety,
hardly comparable legislative formulations, the different legal structures, the possible
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difference between case-law, and the verbatim legal text. Therefore, giving scores to a few
indicators caused some uncertainty. Most of the scores were validated by local legal experts;
however, some indicators were debated. We mitigate most of these open issues by iterating
the expert opinions, expanding legal sources, and also by estimating the sensitivity of some
categorial scores on the final index scores. We conclude that even if opinions might differ
in some cases, they do not alter the final country index scores and the ranking significantly.
Our results open the gate to new research areas. With the composite index, the leniency
of other countries outside Europe can also be measured and ranked. A cross-time analysis
can present how the leniency levels of EU countries (and the overall EU) have changed
and whether other patterns or tendencies exist. The differences in bankruptcy statistics,
entrepreneurial activities, labour supply, and credit market conditions can be analysed
and explained (cross-country and cross-time, based on the leniency index level changes
and differences) with a compact measure. On the other hand, the main drivers causing
differences among countries are still not obvious. The legislation age and leniency show
strong associations, but further analysis is required to find more explanatory factors.
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Appendix A.2. Correlation Matrix of Dimensions 
 SB_DIM EL_DIM CO_DIM CX_DIM PR_DIM DC_DIM ST_DIM 
SB_DIM 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 0.292 −0.115 −0.127 0.180 0.149 −0.111 
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CX_DIM 
Pearson 
Correlation −0.127 −0.138 −0.107 1 0.215 0.198 0.123 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.546 0.511 0.610  0.302 0.344 0.557 
PR_DIM 
Pearson 
Correlation 0.180 0.224 0.341 0.215 1 −0.257 0.265 




0.149 0.132 −0.132 0.198 −0.257 1 −0.002 




−0.111 0.179 0.406 * 0.123 0.265 −0.002 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.598 0.393 0.044 0.557 0.200 0.994  
  
SB1 SB2 EL1 EL2 EL3 EL4 EL5 CO1 CO2 CO3 CX1 CX2 CX3 CX4 CX5 PR1 PR2 PR3 PR4 PR5 PR6 PR7 PR8 PR9 PR10 PR11 DC1 DC2 DC3 DC4 DC5 ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4
Austria 2 0 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 1
Belgium 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 1 2
Croatia 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 0
Cyprus 1 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1
Czech R. 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 1
Denmark 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 2
Estonia 2 0 2 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 2
Finland 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 0 2
France 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 2
Germany 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 1
Greece 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 1 2 1
Hungary 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0
Ireland 2 0 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 1 1
Italy 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 0
Latvia 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 1
Lithuania 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 2 0
Luxembou 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
Netherlan 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 0 2
Poland 2 0 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 2
Romania 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1
Slovakia 2 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 1 2 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 2
Slovenia 1 0 2 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 0 1
Spain 2 0 2 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
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Appendix A.2. Correlation Matrix of Dimensions
SB_DIM EL_DIM CO_DIM CX_DIM PR_DIM DC_DIM ST_DIM
Pearson
Correlation
1 0.292 −0.115 −0.127 0.180 0.149 −0.111
SB_DIM
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.157 0.584 0.546 0.389 0.476 0.598
Pearson
Correlation
0.292 1 −0.069 −0.138 0.224 0.132 0.179
EL_DIM
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.157 0.742 0.511 0.282 0.529 0.393
Pearson
Correlation
−0.115 −0.069 1 −0.107 0.341 −0.132 0.406 *
CO_DIM
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.584 0.742 0.610 0.096 0.530 0.044
Pearson
Correlation
−0.127 −0.138 −0.107 1 0.215 0.198 0.123
CX_DIM
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.546 0.511 0.610 0.302 0.344 0.557
Pearson
Correlation
0.180 0.224 0.341 0.215 1 −0.257 0.265
PR_DIM
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.389 0.282 0.096 0.302 0.215 0.200
Pearson
Correlation
0.149 0.132 −0.132 0.198 −0.257 1 −0.002
DC_DIM
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.476 0.529 0.530 0.344 0.215 0.994
Pearson
Correlation
−0.111 0.179 0.406 * 0.123 0.265 −0.002 1
ST_DIM
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.598 0.393 0.044 0.557 0.200 0.994
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Appendix A.3. Cluster-Elbow Analysis Based on 3 Dimensions (Eligibility, Expensiveness,
Discharge)
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Appendix A.4. K-Mean Cluster Results of 3-4-5 Clusters Based on the 3 Dimensions (Eligibility,
Expensiveness, Discharge)
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Cluster Membership (5)  Cluster Membership (4)    Cluster Membership (3) 
Case 
Number Countries Cluster Distance  
Case 
Number Country Cluster Distance    
Case 
Number Country Cluster Distance 
1 Denmark 1 0.309  6 Denmark 1 0.309    4 Cyprus 1 0.295 
2 France 1 0.360  9 France 1 0.360    5 Czech R. 1 0.537 
3 Luxembourg 1 0.181  17 Luxembourg 1 0.181    7 Estonia 1 0.291 
4 Poland 1 0.679  19 Poland 1 0.679    10 Germany 1 0.290 
5 Slovakia 1 0.421  22 Slovakia 1 0.421    11 Greece 1 0.390 
6 Spain 1 0.441  24 Spain 1 0.441    13 Ireland 1 0.170 
7 Sweden 1 0.376  25 Sweden 1 0.376    14 Italy 1 0.356 
8 Belgium 2 0.351  2 Belgium 2 0.415    23 Slovenia 1 0.311 
9 Hungary 2 0.270 12 Hungary 2 0.205 2 Belgium 2 0.426 
10 Romania 2 0.169 21 Romania 2 0.253 8 Finland 2 0.626 
11 Austria 3 0.216  1 Austria 3 0.216    12 Hungary 2 0.649 
12 Croatia 3 0.358  3 Croatia 3 0.358    15 Latvia 2 0.965 
13 Czech R. 3 0.460  5 Czech R. 3 0.460    16 Lithuania 2 0.632 
14 Finland 3 0.710  8 Finland 3 0.710    18 Netherlands 2 0.570 
15 Netherlands 3 0.331  18 Netherlands 3 0.331    21 Romania 2 0.647 
16 Portugal 3 0.370  20 Portugal 3 0.370    1 Austria 3 0.548 
17 Cyprus 4 0.359  4 Cyprus 4 0.359    3 Croatia 3 0.509 
18 Estonia 4 0.273  7 Estonia 4 0.273    6 Denmark 3 0.334 
19 Germany 4 0.275  10 Germany 4 0.275    9 France 3 0.462 
20 Greece 4 0.316  11 Greece 4 0.316    17 Luxembourg 3 0.328 
21 Ireland 4 0.189  13 Ireland 4 0.189    19 Poland 3 0.678 
22 Italy 4 0.349  14 Italy 4 0.349    20 Portugal 3 0.262 
23 Slovenia 4 0.288  23 Slovenia 4 0.288    22 Slovakia 3 0.411 
24 Latvia 5 0.279  15 Latvia 5 0.219    24 Spain 3 0.381 
25 Lithuania 5 0.279  16 Lithuania 5 0.219    25 Sweden 3 0.489 




1 Straight bankruptcy is a process similar to Chapter 7 in the US Bankruptcy code, where after a relatively rapid liquidation or 
asset sale process, the debtor receives a discharge at the end. 
2 By scoring, we took the national legislations, the selected chapter of Sajadova (consumer insolvency proceeding: comparative 
legal aspects), and the country reports of Melcher and Lurger (Austria), Storme and Helsen (Belgium), Garasic (Croatia), 
Demetriadi et al. (Cyprus), Sprinz (Czech R.), Orgaard (Denmark), Sajadova and Viirsalu (Estonia), Jaatinen and Remes 
(Finland), Rublellin and Booth (France), Keinert and Vallender (Germany), Venieris (Greece), Holohan and Farry (Ireland), 
Cerini et al. (Italy), Sajadova (Lithuania), Hoffeld and Franczak (Luxembourg), Jungmann and Madern (The Netherland), 
Porzicky and Rachwal (Poland), Carvalho, et al. (Portugal), Zidaru (Romania), Orsula (Slovakia), Dordevic (Slovenia), Arias 
(Spain), and Hellström (Sweden) as given in Graziano et al. (2019). 
3 The strongest correlation with relatively high significance is between expensiveness and stigma (correlation coefficient of 0.4 
and significance of 0.04). See correlation matrix in Appendix A.2. 
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ANOVA (3) 





Square df     
EL_DIM 2.418 2 0.045 22 53.393 0.000 
CO_DIM 3.117 2 0.134 22 23.326 0.000 
DC_DIM 0.048 2 0.098 22 0.486 0.622 









EL_DIM 1.612 3 0.047 21 33.980 0.000 
CO_DIM 2.654 3 0.058 21 46.020 0.000 
DC_DIM 0.032 3 0.103 21 0.311 0.817 
 
ANOVA (5) 





Square df     
CO_DIM 2.113 4 0.036 20 58.741 0.000 
DC_DIM 0.170 4 0.078 20 2.168 0.110 
EL_DIM 1.189 4 0.054 20 22.128 0.000 
Notes
1 Straight bankruptcy is a process similar to Chapter 7 in the US Bankruptcy code, where after a relatively rapid liquidation or
asset sale process, the debtor receives a discharge at the end.
2 By scoring, we took the national legislations, the selected chapter of Sajadova (consumer insolvency proceeding: comparative
legal aspects), and the country reports of Melcher and Lurger (Austria), Storme and Helsen (Belgium), Garasic (Croatia),
Demetriadi et al. (Cyprus), Sprinz (Czech R.), Orgaard (Denmark), Sajadova and Viirsalu (Estonia), Jaatinen and Remes (Finland),
Rublellin and Booth (France), Keinert and Vallender (Germany), Venieris (Greece), Holohan and Farry (Ireland), Cerini et al.
(Italy), Sajadova (Lithuania), Hoffeld and Franczak (Luxembourg), Jungmann and Madern (The Netherland), Porzicky and
Rachwal (Poland), Carvalho, et al. (Portugal), Zidaru (Romania), Orsula (Slovakia), Dordevic (Slovenia), Arias (Spain), and
Hellström (Sweden) as given in Graziano et al. (2019).
3 The strongest correlation with relatively high significance is between expensiveness and stigma (correlation coefficient of 0.4 and
significance of 0.04). See correlation matrix in Appendix A.2.
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